We consider corruption behavior in a three-players game: Principal, Agent, Briber. We argue that when the Principal chooses a fair wage, the Agent faces conflicting interests to reciprocate. This gives rise to a delegation effect, which could undercut corruption as compared to what arises in two...

While post-employment restrictions may encourage firms to invest in employee skill and research and development (R&D), such restrictions may also under certain circumstances discourage employees from investing in their own human capital and work performance. The article reports the findings of...

Iuris prudentia, non iuris scientia. For many lawyers, this bit of Latin settles the affair. Scientific methods are not for us lawyers. If the natural scientists believe in randomized trials, be that so. We have a different task. We have to interpret the law, maybe also contribute to its...

Some contract theorists favor specific performance as the appropriate remedy for contract breach. According to ethical theorists, specific performance reinforces the moral obligation that promises should be kept. Some economists argue that specific performance promotes efficient contract...

The choice of appropriate remedies is a major concern in all legal spheres, yet little has been done to determine which remedies people actually prefer. Scholarly debates on this issue are typically based on theoretical arguments and intuitions rather than experimental or empirical data. It is...

Contracts commit individuals to a future course of action and create feelings of entitlement on the parties. In a contractual gap, parties’ duties and rights are not univocal, and while promisors will often feel entitled to breach, promisees will feel entitled to receive the promised...

In tort litigation, delayed settlement or impasse imposes high costs on the parties and society. Litigation institutions might influence social welfare by affecting the likelihood of out-of-court settlement and the potential injurers' investment in product safety. An appropriate design of...

We consider corruption behavior in a three-players game: Principal, Agent, Corrupter. When the Principal chooses a fair wage, the Agent faces conflicting interests to reciprocate. This delegation effect is expected to lower the level of corruption as compared to what arises in two-players...

Science evolves in the long run. Law rules in the present. This potential temporal disconnect leads to a Hayekian “knowledge problem”, a challenge increasingly raised against behavioral law and economics: Empirical findings are deemed too uncertain to provide a solid basis for legal...

On the doctrinal surface, there is a deep divide between common and continental law when it comes to the origin of contractual obligations. Under continental law, in principle a unilateral promise suffices. Common law by contrast requires consideration. When it comes to deciding cases, the...