In this study, we examine the wealth effects of regulatory changes intended to improve corporate governance by protecting minority shareholders from expropriation by controlling shareholders. Using data from publicly traded Chinese firms, we find that these new regulations significantly...

We examine stock returns for a sample of publicly traded Chinese firms around announcements of block share transfers from government agencies to corporatized firms where the State is the ultimate controlling shareholder. We provide evidence that these transfers improve corporate governance and...

We examine changes in market values and accounting returns for a sample of publicly traded Chinese firms around announcements of block-share transfers among government agencies (quot;State Bureaucratsquot;), market-oriented State-owned enterprises (quot;MOSOEsquot;) and private investors...

We examine the wealth effects of three regulatory changes designed to improve minority-shareholder protection in the Chinese stock markets. Using the value of a firm's related-party transactions as an inverse proxy for the quality of corporate governance, we find that firms with weaker...

We identify and analyze a sample of publicly traded Chinese firms that issued loan guarantees to their related parties (usually the controlling block holders), thereby expropriating wealth from minority shareholders. Our results show that the issuance of related guarantees is less likely at...