Studies of management's disregard of the will of the shareholders have focused on combinations of entrenchment mechanisms and special governance structures. However, management's power to issue stock, a fundamental element of the ability of management to control the corporation regardless of the...

In this essay, Vice Chancellor Strine reflects on the common interests of those who manage and those who labor for American corporations. The first part of the essay examines aspects of the current corporate governance and economic environment that are putting management and labor under...

Under German law, the subscribed capital of a company can either be paid up in cash or in kind. Contributions in kind are subject to special rules because they pose the danger of an overvaluation of assets which is detrimental to both the other members of the company and to its creditors. Thus,...

European corporate law and corporate governance are moving ahead beyond expectation. Some British voices called this “a renaissance in the past decade”. In December 2012, the European Commission came forward with an Action Plan that combines both corporate law and corporate governance rules...

Minority shareholders tend not to participate in the decision-making process of public companies with a controlling shareholder, and their voice is rarely heard. Even when they disagree with how the company is being managed, they prefer to express this dissatisfaction by selling their shares...

In this paper, I analyse the rise of mandatory structure of bankers' pay in Europe as outcome of criticism of pre-crisis remuneration practices at financial institutions. Whether flawed bankers' pay contributed to the financial crisis is still debated amongst scholars. It appears more likely...

In several recent cases, the Delaware Chancery Court has emphasized that where a conflict of interest exists between holders of a company's common stock and holders of its preferred stock, the standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive to maximize the value of the corporation...

Conventional wisdom among corporate law theorists holds that the presence of a controlling shareholder should alleviate the problem of managerial opportunism because such a controller has both the power and incentives to curb excessive executive pay. This Article challenges that common...