We argue that the effectiveness of aligning incentives through greed and fear reductions cannot be examined independent of the relational context molded by trust and time horizon. We propose that trust and time horizon jointly give rise to apprehension and temptation, which in turn generate...

Researchers agree that both, a higher level of trust and a longer time horizon, increase the odds of successful collaboration. But research efforts to date have focused more on charting the territory of each construct rather than on integrating the two. We hypothesize that the trustor's time...

We argue that neither trust-based nor time horizon-based view of relational governance alone is sufficient to grasp the holistic notion of ongoing-social ties that characterized most relationships. The central thesis of this paper is that the effectiveness of aligning incentives through Greed...

We propose that formal and informal enforcement mechanisms have a substituting as well as complementing effect. Building on the literature on cooperation in the provision F public good, we argue that the effectiveness of punishment vs. protection as a formal mechanism hinges on the extent to...

This paper argues that formal and informal enforcement mechanisms not only substitute but also complement each other in fostering cooperation. Our central tenet is that whether protection or punishment is the more effective formal mechanism to promote cooperation hinges on the configuration of...