We focus on downstream uses that combine multiple intellectual property rights and examine the effects of introducing an intellectual property clearinghouse that reduces transaction costs associated with licensing. We show that this causes equilibrium royalties to rise in some cases and may harm...

This paper reviews and compares patent pools, intellectual property clearinghouses and copyright collectives as alternative systems for promoting efficient access to licensable intellectual property in a 'market for technology' (Arora et al 2001). These systems aid downstream use of innovations...

We examine third-party clearinghouses that license innovations on behalf of inventors when downstream uses require licenses to multiple complementary innovations. We consider two simple clearinghouse royalty redistribution schemes, and two different innovation environments. We show that in most...

This paper presents the results of a survey of economics bloggers. The survey attempted to assess the characteristics of these bloggers, their blogging activity, and factors affecting their motivations for blogging. Based on the results, bloggers are also separated into groups of academics and...

We analyse the basic economic issues relating to third-party intellectual property clearinghouses that act as licensing intermediaries. We identify economic functions of clearinghouses and discuss ways that they can improve efficiency in licensing through centralisation and independence. We then...

This paper illustrates basic pricing issues in two-sided markets using some simple linear models based on Rochet & Tirole (2006) and Armstrong (2006). Monopoly, first-best and second-best prices when a single platform charges either usage fees or membership fees are examined. Some implications...

We consider patent pool formation by owners of essential patents for differentiated standards that may be complements or substitutes in use. Pooling improves coordination in terms of royalty setting within a standard but provokes a strategic response from licensors in the competing standard. We...