’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price … auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities …

price auction over non-conflicting groups and examine how non-rivalry impacts both efficiency and collusion. Conditions are … are given under which collusion in a group auction results in higher prices. … studied for non-rivalrous goods. I examine an auction framework where the good sold can be used simultaneously by multiple …

first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second …-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. We experimentally find that in the first …-price auction, leaks benefit second movers but harm first movers and sellers. Low to medium probabilities of leak eliminate the …

propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects … that may prevent corruption, and compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auction houses. …

auction is the better selling mechanism. However, why exactly an auction should be preferred is unclear. Here we present an …

We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation … decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while …