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Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael - 2021

We show experimentally that a principal's distrust in the voluntary performance of an agent has a negative impact on … the agent's motivation to perform well. Before the agent chooses his performance, the principal in our experiment decides … opportunistically. We find that most principals in our experiment do not restrict the agent's choice set but trust that the agent will …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319211

Legitimacy of control

Schnedler, Wendelin; Vadovic, Radovan - 2007

What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort require- ment? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal- agent model where control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003592848

Trust, trustworthiness and selection into the financial industry

Gill, Andrej; Heinz, Matthias; Schumacher, Heiner - 2014

We examine trust and trustworthiness of individuals with varying professional preferences and experiences. Our subjects … study business and economics in Frankfurt, the financial center of Germany and continental Europe. In the trust game … process. In a prediction game that is strategically equivalent to the trust game, the amount sent by first-movers was …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360924

Playing "hard to get": an economic rationale for crowding out of intrinsically motivated behavior

Schnedler, Wendelin; Vanberg, Christoph - 2014

it becomes scarce. In the second, restraint serves to conceal the actor's intrinsic motivation. In both cases, not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362185

Playing "hard to get" : an economic rationale for crowding out of intrinsically motivated behavior

Schnedler, Wendelin; Vanberg, Christoph - 2014

it becomes scarce. In the second, restraint serves to conceal the actor's intrinsic motivation. In both cases, not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010345273

Sleep restriction and time-of-day impacts on simple social interaction

Dickinson, David L.; McElroy, Todd - 2016

classic simple bargaining games (ultimatum, dictator, and trust games). Specifically, we experimentally manipulate sleep … time‐of‐day of the decisions. We find a robust result of increased greed, reduced trust, and reduced trustworthiness …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450381

Fairness and contract design

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2005 - This version: November 5, 2005

trust contracts that pay a generous wage upfront are less efficient than incentive contracts. The principals understand this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371080

The Pros and Cons of Workplace Tournaments

Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2016

Tournaments are commonly used in the workplace to determine promotion, assign bonuses, and motivate personal development. Tournament-based contracts can be very effective in eliciting high effort, often outperforming other compensation contracts, but they can also have negative consequences for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014124556

Experimental Research on Contests

Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2018

Costly competitions between economic agents are modeled as contests. Researchers use laboratory experiments to study contests and test comparative static predictions of contest theory. Commonly, researchers find that participants' efforts are significantly higher than predicted by the standard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012910152

A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments

Dechenaux, Emmanuel - 2012

Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly efforts while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100140