Typical contracts assign both coercive and non-coercive means of power to the principal's side, providing the agent with a comparably small range of countervailing anti-power. Initially agents are therefore vulnerable to opportunistic principal behavior and will rationally anticipate this threat...

Early research work theorized franchising to exist because Hybridal Form Benefits (HFB) are achieved by the franchisor. Compared to the full hierarchy, franchising was held to reduce agency costs, to overcome resource scarcity and to enable risk sharing. Lately, the focus has shifted to an...

This work explores the strategic motivation of franchisors to combine franchised and company-owned stores when structuring their distribution networks. In the United States, such plurally organized chains have already outnumbered purely franchised competitors.Based on a review of existing...

In this paper, we examine ownership structures of franchise chains and evaluate their impact on franchisor profit. Specifically we compare pure forms of franchising with those that use both company-owned and franchised outlets within one chain - a phenomenon termed the plural form. Theoretically...

Typical contracts assign both coercive and non-coercive means of power to the principal's side, providing the agent with a comparably small range of countervailing anti-power. Initially agents are therefore vulnerable to opportunistic principal behavior and will rationally anticipate this threat...

This paper reviews the most important aspects that students of economics and of business administration should focus on when beginning their career as authors of scientific papers. The author, a PhD-candidate at the University of Muenster, Germany, draws from personal experience as a reviewer...