We argue that it is the number of agents holding market power, rather than the presence of market power itself, that may force Ricardian economies into autarchy. We apply the concepts of monopoly equilibrium by Baldwin (1948) to the model of Cordella and Gabszewicz (1997) to show that,...

In an extended version of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) R&D competition model we find a region where the game is a prisoner's dilemma: firms still invest in R&D but they would obtain a higher profit by not investing at all. In a repeated version of the game, we prove that firms implicitly...

We revisit Maxwell's (1998) analysis to show that MQS regulation has no effects on the high-quality firm's incentive to adopt a more efficient technology in a vertically differentiated duopoly with fixed costs of quality improvement and full market coverage