Using car dealership data, we examine the relevance of forward-looking (FL) and contemporaneous (CO) measures for pay-for-performance incentives (bonus, annual raise, promotions) for long-horizon employees. Economic models suggest that while contracts with FL performance measures mitigates the...

Understanding an organization's incentive design requires that researchers collectively examine all forms of incentive instruments, namely, bonus, merit raise, and promotion, since these are common components of an incentive structure. Prior research on the weighting of performance measures...

Agency theory argues that pay-performance sensitivity should be negatively associated with risk. Yet, empirical studies have reported mixed findings on this relationship, which may be attributable to such confounding factors as different levels of delegation and monitoring costs. Extending prior...

We investigate how geographic distance relates to corporate investment decisions (i.e., investment location and ownership structure choices), using a setting of Taiwanese firms' investment in mainland China. We measure geographic distance as travel time between parent firms (in Taiwan) and...

Agency theory argues that pay-performance sensitivity to agents should be negatively associated with risk; however, some empirical evidence suggests the opposite. While analytical studies do not reach consensus on the relation between competition and pay-performance sensitivity, empirical...