We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates

This paper extends the concept of weak renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRP) to allow for costly renegotiation and shows that even small renegotiation costs can have dramatic effects on the set of equilibria. More specifically, the paper analyzes the infinitely repeated Bertrand game. It is...

We show that the anticipation of COVID-19 vaccines reduces voluntary social distancing. In a large-scale preregistered survey experiment with a representative sample, we study whether providing information about the safety, effectiveness, and availability of COVID- 19 vaccines affects compliance...

Recent experimental evidence suggests that noisy behavior correlates strongly with cognitive ability. This puts previous studies that found a negative relation between cognitive ability and risk aversion into perspective and in particular raises the question of how to achieve robust inference in...

Recent experimental studies suggest that risk aversion is negatively related to cognitive ability. In this paper we report evidence that this relation might be spurious. We recruit a large subject pool drawn from the general Danish population for our experiment. By presenting subjects with...

Recent experimental studies suggest that risk aversion is negatively related to cognitive ability. In this paper we report evidence that this relation might be spurious.We recruit a large subject pool drawn from the general Danish population for our experiment. By presenting subjects with choice...

We study risk taking on behalf of others in an experiment on a large random sample. The decision makers in our experiment are facing high-powered incentives to increase the risk on behalf of others through hedged compensation contracts or with tournament incentives. Compared to a baseline...

We study risk taking on behalf of others, both with and without potential losses. A large-scale incentivized experiment is conducted with subjects randomly drawn from the Danish population. On average, decision makers take the same risks for other people as for themselves when losses are...

This paper extends the concept of weak renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRP) to allow for costly renegotiation and shows that even small renegotiation costs can have dramatic effects on the set of equilibria. More specifically, the paper analyzes the infinitely repeated Bertrand game. It is...