This paper investigates the role of uncertainty as a tool to support cooperation in international environmental agreements. We consider two layers of uncertainty: one where only the follower is uninformed about the leader's environmental concern, which we refer as "unilateral uncertainty," and...

Recent experimental evidence supports the influence of a player's unchosen alternatives on other agent's actions. This paper examines a tractable theoretical model of reference-dependent preferences in which individuals compare other players' chosen action with respect to their unchosen...

This paper examines the two externalities that a country's environmental regulation imposes on other country's welfare: an environmental externality, due to transboundary pollution, and, a competitive advantage externality, as regulations affect domestic firms' abatement costs, which impact the...

This paper examines countries' free-riding in international environmental agreements (IEA) when, first, the treaty is non-enforceable, and second, countries do not have complete information about other countries' noncompliance cost. We analyze a signaling model whereby the country leading the...

This article summarizes results of a study that investigates the signaling role of environmental policy in promoting, or hindering, the ability of a monopolist to practice entry deterrence. We show that environmental policy can facilitate the incumbent firm’s concealment of information from...

We examine an environmental policy which may be revisited by a new administration. We allow for pollution to be persistent over time and for uncertainty in next period's environmental policy. When pollution is non-persistent, we show that regulatory uncertainty is inconsequential for output,...

Chapter 1. Introduction to games and their representation.-Chapter 2. Equilibrium dominance.-Chapter 3. Nash equilibrium.-Chapter 4. Nash equilibria in games with continuous action spaces.-Chapter 5. Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium -- Chapter 6. Subgame perfect equilibrium -- Chapter 7. Repeated...

This paper investigates an entry-deterrence model where a potential entrant, uninformed about the incumbent firm's production costs, observes two signals: the incumbent's output decision and the emission fee set by an informed regulator. We study contexts in which emission fees are flexible and...