This paper reports an experiment which compares behaviour in two punishment regimes: (i) a standard public goods game …

the Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game when information about their own and the other person's mask usage was not salient …. However, we found strong evidence of in-group favouritism among both mask and non-mask wearers when information about the …

A novel version of a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game tests how player cooperation responds to changes in … incentives, i.e., payoffs that depend on performance relative to different reference groups. Cooperation is greatest when players …

This paper reports the results of an experiment on information spillovers between groups. We find that a player who is … a member of multiple groups aggregates information and serves as a conduit through which information from one group … of only a single group. We introduce a novel measure of the magnitude of information spillovers, and we identify the …

). In this paper we address this question by using a measure of costly cooperation elicited in a laboratory experiment to … laboratory experiments with 645 subjects at a trucker training program in the Midwestern US. The experiment use a version of the … prisoner's dilemma game to measure subjects' preferences for cooperation. The authors observe the same subjects on the job for …

. While there is conflicting experimental evidence on the temporal stability of cooperation preferences in public goods … literature by testing whether social identity impacts on cooperation preferences in public goods provision. Specifically, our … experiment features a within subject design based on one shot public good games in strategy method, which are carried out in …

and using a 2x2 between subject game theoretic experiment, we analyze how a competitive/collaborative setting, as well as …

is an internalization tax to mitigate a local market externality. Our results demonstrate the importance of information …

individual, reputation. Groups can employ two mechanisms to uphold reputation that are unavailable to individuals: information … sharing and in-group punishment. We design a laboratory experiment to distinguish the roles of these mechanisms when … the group identity of one's partner is known. Treatments differ by whether information about group members' transactions …