Motivated by the insight of Keynes (1936) on the importance of higher-order beliefs in financial markets, we examine the role of such beliefs in generating drift in asset prices. We show that in a dynamic setting, a higher-order difference of opinions is necessary for heterogeneous beliefs to...

The empirical evidence on investor disagreement and trading volume is difficult to reconcile in standard rational expectations models. We develop a dynamic model in which investors disagree about the interpretations of public information. We obtain a closed-form linear equilibrium that allows us...

Motivated by the insight of Keynes (1936) on the importance of higher order beliefs in financial markets, we examine the role of such beliefs in generating drift in asset prices. We show that in a dynamic setting, a higher order difference of opinions is necessary for heterogeneous beliefs to...

Why do firms engage in costly, voluntary disclosure of informationwhich is subsumed by a later announcement? We consider a model inwhich the firm's manager can choose to disclose short-term informationwhich becomes redundant later. When disclosure costs are sufficientlylow, the manager discloses...

We study how leaks affect a firm's communication decisions and real efficiency. A privately informed manager strategically chooses both public disclosure and internal communication to employees. Public disclosure is noisy, but in the absence of leaks, internal communication is perfectly...