This chapter provides new evidence on borrowers' hidden information about their riskiness and its link to their impatience. To do so, I analyze consumer loans on the German platform Smava, which has a unique peer-to-peer lending process. Observationally identical but unobservably riskier...

Although credit rationing has been a stylized fact since the groundbreaking papers by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, hereinafter S-W) and Besanko and Thakor (1987a, hereinafter B-T), Arnold and Riley (2009) note that credit rationing is unlikely in the S-W model, and Clemenz (1993) shows that it does...

Chapter 1 theoretically shows why lenders ration loan size and loan applicants to screen borrowers' riskiness in a competitive spot loan market with imperfect information. Chapter 2 theoretically examines how lenders can reduce costs to screen borrowers' riskiness by a commitment to grant a loan...

Measuring interdependence between probabilities of default (PDs) in different industry sectors of an economy plays a crucial role in financial stress testing. Thereby, regression approaches may be employed to model the impact of stressed industry sectors as covariates on other response sectors....

Many loan commitment contracts contain a material adverse change clause which allows banks to renege or step back from their commitment based on rather subjective claims regarding the borrowers' prospective financial situation. While this sounds like an attractive option for banks, empirical...