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We address the question to which degree the private information of a decision maker is revealed through his action, in an environment with compact metrizable state and action space. We show that the decision maker's optimal action reveals his posterior distribution for a generic set of...
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In [1], it was shown that in games of perfect information, common knowledge of rationality entails that the backward induction outcome is reached, and is consistent (for short, entails BI). That work has been criticized because it assumes that a player chooses rationally at all his nodes, even...
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The canonical Bayesian persuasion setting studies a model where an informed agent, the Sender, can partially share his information with an uninformed agent, the Receiver. The Receiver's utility is a function of the state of nature and the Receiver's action while the Sender's is only a function...
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New ways of doing things often get started through the actions of a few innovators, then diffuse rapidly as more and more people come into contact with prior adopters in their social network. Much of the literature focuses on the speed of diffusion as a function of the network topology. In...
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We study a social learning model with payoff externalities in which one of two state-dependent games is chosen at random and then played repeatedly by a different group of agents. Each "generation" observes the history of actions and receives conditionally independent private signals about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014139369
This paper provides a model of social learning where the order in which actions are taken is determined by an m-dimensional integer lattice rather than along a line as in the herding model. The observation structure is determined by a random network. Every agent links to each of his preceding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013002859
Two firms produce substitute goods with unknown quality. At each stage the firms set prices and a consumer with private information and unit demand buys from one of the firms. Both firms and consumers see the entire history of prices and purchases. Will such markets aggregate information? Will...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012968063