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When should prinipals asquire verifiable information?
Feess, Eberhard; Schieble, Michael; Walzl, Markus - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002721593
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Credit scoring and incentives for loan officers in a principal agent model
Feess, Eberhard; Schieble, Michael - 1999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013444384
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When bidding more is not enough : all-pay auctions with handicaps
Feess, Eberhard (contributor);  … - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001825484
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Delegated expertise - when are good projects bad news?
Feess, Eberhard; Walzl, Markus - In: Economics letters 82 (2004) 1, pp. 77-82
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001877567
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The impact of truth-telling and limited wealth in a principal-agent model
Feess, Eberhard; Ossig, Sonja; Walzl, Markus - In: Schmalenbach business review : sbr 57 (2005) 1, pp. 29-45
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002523339
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Discussion of "The impact of truth-telling and limited wealth in a principal-agent model"
Ewert, Ralf - In: Schmalenbach business review : sbr 57 (2005) 1, pp. 46-54
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002523355
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An analysis of corporate leniency programs and lessons to learn for EU and US policies
Feess, Eberhard; Walzl, Markus - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002485585
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Self-reporting in optimal law enforcement when there are criminal teams
Feess, Eberhard; Walzl, Markus - In: Economica 71 (2004), pp. 333-348
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002134010
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Unfair contests
Feess, Eberhard; Mühlheußer, Gerd; Walzl, Markus - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002721619
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Optimal self-reporting schemes with multiple stages and option values
Feess, Eberhard; Walzl, Markus - In: International tax and public finance 12 (2005) 3, pp. 265-279
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002889962