We propose a new approach for running lab experiments on indefinitely repeated games with high continuation probability. This approach has two main advantages. First, it allows us to run multiple long repeated games per session. Second, it allows us to incorporate the strategy method with...

We develop a model of learning that extends the classic models of reinforcement learning to a continuous, multidimensional strategy space. The model takes advantage of the recent approximation methods to tackle the curse of dimensionality inherent to a traditional discretization approach....

Identifying the strategies that are played is critical to understanding behavior in repeated games. This process is difficult because only choices (not strategies) are observable. Recently, a debate has emerged regarding whether subjects play mixed strategies in the indefinitely repeated...

We study equilibrium selection in indefinitely repeated coordination games with and without payoff asymmetries. In the symmetric games, repeated interactions make it possible to achieve outcomes that are both efficient and egalitarian. In the asymmetric games, however, equality is at odds with...

We use laboratory experiments to test for one of the foundations of the rational voter paradigm - that voters respond to probabilities of being pivotal. We exploit a setup that entails stark theoretical effects of information concerning the preference distribution (as revealed through polls) on...