We propose a mechanism explaining how elections may legitimize autocratic government even if they are undeniably not free and not fair. We advocate the concept of elections as a mechanism to manipulate public beliefs about the true popularity of an autocratic government. Instead of being...

We propose an extension of the traditional spatial model that combines both programmatic as well as clientelistic modes of electoral vote-seeking. In particular, we model parties that strategically choose (1) their policy position, (2) the effort they devote to clientelism as opposed to the...

Under electoral authoritarianism, the opposition's victory at the polls often precipitates regime change. Yet, opposition parties persistently find it difficult to mobilize their supporters. In this study, we examine the effectiveness of information campaigns administered as part of a cluster...

Empirical researchers studying party systems often struggle with the question of how to count parties. Indexes of party system fragmentation used to address this problem (e.g., the effective number of parties) have a fundamental shortcoming: since the same index value may represent very...

The paper presents a Bayesian model for estimating ideological ambiguity of political parties from survey data. In the model, policy positions are defined as probability distributions over a policy space and survey-based party placements are treated as random draws from those distributions. A...

We use plausibly exogenous variation in the availability of Russian analog television signal in Ukraine to study how a media source with a conspicuous political agenda impacts political behavior and attitudes. Using highly granular election data and an original survey we estimate that Russian...

The paper proposes a mechanism explaining how elections may stabilize an autocratic regime even if they are evidently unfree and unfair. Instead of being meaningless rituals, non-democratic elections can help the autocrats in managing and communicating the public information about the regime's...

People from specific ethnic, religious, or other externally identifiable groups are often subjected to harsher repression than others. This phenomenon of demographically targeted repression is often viewed as a result of xenophobia. I provide a rationalist explanation of demographic targeting to...

Conventional wisdom says that autocrats manipulate news through censorship. But when it comes to economic affairs -- a highly sensitive topics for modern autocrats -- the government's ability to censor information effectively is limited, because citizens can benchmark the official news against...