This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive contracts. To this end we … develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other …. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find …

this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward … each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal …, while worse social relationships may increase productivity and players' utility in equilibrium. -- altruism ; spite ; social …

this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward … each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal …

this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward … each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal …

altruism sometimes provides a net incentive to report performance truthfully, rather than to bias evaluations upward. The …

. This is not caused by monetary incentives per se since under both wage schemes it is profit-maximizing for agents to exert …

. This is not caused by monetary incentives per se since under both wage schemes it is profit-maximizing for agents to exert …

. This is not caused by monetary incentives per se since under both wage schemes it is profit-maximizing for agents to exert …

Are monetary and non-monetary incentives used as substitutes in motivating effort? I address this question in a … and non-monetary incentives imperfect. These findings have implications for the design of incentives in mission …