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Monitoring and privacy in automobile insurance markets with moral hazard

Filipova, Lilia (contributor) - 2007

may choose the precision of monitoring. Also privacy costs incurred thereby are taken into account. Two alternative … data. With any contract scheme some monitoring will be optimal unless the privacy costs increase too fast in relation to … the precision of the monitoring signal. In the benchmark situation (without privacy costs) relying completely on both …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003547443

Endogenous information and privacy in automobile insurance markets

Filipova-Neumann, Lilia - 2006

insurance markets with adverse selection and without commitment. Under the consideration of the inherent costs related to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009744919

On Moral Hazard and Nonexclusive Contracts

Chassagnon, Arnold; Attar, Andrea - 2006

We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. Our setting is the same as that developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004]. The present note provides a counterexample to Proposition 2, 3 and 4 in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004]...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014055217

Better safe than sorry? : ex ante and ex post moral hazard in dynamic insurance data

Abbring, Jaap H.; Chiappori, Pierre-André; Zavadil, Tibor - 2008

This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's dynamic risk (ex … ante moral hazard) and claim (ex post moral hazard) choices and Dutch longitudinal micro data. We use the theory to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376656

Exaggerating to Break-Even : Reference-Dependent Moral Hazard in Automobile Insurance Claims

Gao, Feng; Lien, Jaimie W.; Zheng, Jie - 2021

The effects of asymmetric information are often difficult to detect empirically, such as in insurance settings. We show that allowing for reference-dependent preferences can assist with this empirical challenge. Using detailed auto insurance claims data, we show that policyholders exhibit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013245259

A Review of Recent Theoretical and Empirical Analyses of Asymmetric Information in Road Safety and Automobile Insurance

Dionne, Georges - 2012

Road safety policies and automobile insurance contracts often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations and accidents to promote safe driving. Can these mechanisms improve road safety efficiently? Do they reduce asymmetric information between drivers and insurers and regulators? In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111921

Chapter 5. Insurance and Insurance Markets

Dionne, Georges; Harrington, Scott E. - In: Handbook of the economics of risk and uncertainty : volume 1, (pp. 203-261). 2014

Kenneth Arrow and Karl Borch published several important articles in the early 1960s that can be viewed as the beginning of modern economic analysis of insurance activity. This chapter reviews the main theoretical and empirical contributions in insurance economics since that time. The review...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025527

A Model of the Imf as a Coinsurance Arrangement

Chami, Ralph - 2014

The paper shows that an IMF-like coinsurance arrangement among countries can play a useful role in the global financial system. The operation of the coinsurance arrangement is examined under different loan contracts. It shows that, if the IMF?s objective is to safeguard its resources and be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068880

A Model of the Imf as a Coinsurance Arrangement

Chami, Ralph - 2014

The paper shows that an IMF-like coinsurance arrangement among countries can play a useful role in the global financial system. The operation of the coinsurance arrangement is examined under different loan contracts. It shows that, if the IMF's objective is to safeguard its resources and be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068971

Risk-Sharing or Risk-Taking? Counterparty Risk, Incentives and Margins

Biais, Bruno - 2012

We analyze optimal hedging contracts and show that although hedging aims at sharing risk, it can lead to more risk-taking. News implying that a hedge is likely to be loss-making undermines the risk-prevention incentives of the protection seller. This incentive problem limits the capacity to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013113017