This paper investigates the role of loss-aversion in affecting the long-run equilibria of stochastic evolutionary dynamics. We consider a finite population of loss-averse agents who are repeatedly and randomly matched to play a symmetric two-player normal form game. When an agent revises her...

We consider a dynamic process of collective choice under majority rule in which a status quo policy evolves. The analysis is based on stochastic evolutionary game theory and relates the static solution concepts of social choice theory to a long-run equilibrium in a dynamic voting process. The...

We consider a finite population analogue of the haystack model of Herold (2012). Players repeatedly and randomly break into groups, and play an extensive form game. In the game, Player 1 (players assigned the position of Player 1) either cooperates or defects. Player 2 observes Player 1's...

We consider the long-run outcomes of bargaining games when players obey prospect theory. We extend the evolutionary bargaining model of Young (1993) to a two-stage Nash demand game. Two players simultaneously choose whether to exercise an outside option in the first stage and play the Nash...