Discrete-time stochastic games with a finite number of states have been widely applied to study the strategic interactions among forward-looking players in dynamic environments. However, these games suffer from a curse of dimensionality since the cost of computing players' expectations over all...

Continuous-time stochastic games with a finite number of states have substantial computational and conceptual advantages over the more common discrete-time model. In particular, continuous time avoids a curse of dimensionality and speeds up computations by orders of magnitude in games with more...

Continuous-time stochastic games with a finite number of states have substantial computational and conceptual advantages over the more common discrete-time model. In particular, continuous time avoids a curse of dimensionality and speeds up computations by orders of magnitude in games with more...

We develop a dynamic model in which firms decide when and where to enter a growing market. We do not pre-specify the order of entry, allowing instead for the roles of leader and follower to be determined endogenously. We characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game and show...

Discrete-time stochastic games with a finite number of states have been widely applied to study the strategic interactions among forward-looking players in dynamic environments. These games suffer from a “curse of dimensionality” when the cost of computing players’ expectations over all...