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Hidden insurance in a moral hazard economy
Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried - 2013
with effort-determined probability. We show that if insurance against a negative shock is sufficiently incomplete, then … standard functional form restrictions ensure that individual objective functions are optimized by an effort and insurance … combination that is unique and satisfies first- and second-order conditions. Modeling insurance incompleteness in terms of costly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010225898
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Hidden insurance in a moral hazard economy
Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010244872
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Hidden Insurance in a Moral Hazard Economy
Bertola, Giuseppe - 2013
with effort-determined probability. We show that if insurance against a negative shock is sufficiently incomplete, then … standard functional form restrictions ensure that individual objective functions are optimized by an effort and insurance … combination that is unique and satisfies first- and second-order conditions. Modeling insurance incompleteness in terms of costly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071425
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Hidden insurance in a moral hazard economy
Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010367934
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Hidden insurance in a moral-hazard economy
Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried - In: The Rand journal of economics 46 (2015) 4, pp. 777-790
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011481441
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On the first-order approach in principal–agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
Ábrahám, Árpád; Koehne, Sebastian; Pavoni, Nicola - In: Journal of economic theory 146 (2011) 4, pp. 1331-1361
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009262031
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Insurance and information : firms as a commitment device
Bovenberg, Ary Lans; Teulings, Coen N. - 2001
contracts to crowd out implicit insurance, even though the latter yields higher welfare.Integrating the principal-agent and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316894
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A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
Kirkegaard, René - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 1, pp. 25-51
A new approach to moral hazard is presented. Once local incentive compatibil- ity is satis?ed, the problem of verifying global incentive compatibility is shown to be isomorphic to the problem of comparing two classes of distribution functions. Thus, tools from choice under uncertainty can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704635
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Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship
Budde, Jörg (contributor); Kräkel, Matthias (contributor) - 2008
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle ont hepositive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782288
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The hold-down problem and the boundaries of the firm : lessons from a hidden action model with endogenous outside option
Schnedler, Wendelin; Sunde, Uwe - 2002
This paper offers a rationale for limiting the delegation of (real) authority, which neither relies on insurance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410683