We develop a dynamic two-party political economy framework, in which parties seek to maximize vote share and face the trade-off between catering to their respective core constituencies on the one hand and "middle of the road" voters with no partisan affiliation on the other hand. In contrast to...

We develop a dynamic two-party political economy framework, in which parties seek to maximize vote share and face the trade-off between catering to their respective core constituencies on the one hand and ‘middle of the road’ voters with no partisan affiliation on the other hand. In contrast...

We develop a dynamic two-party political economy framework, in which parties seek to maximize vote share and face the trade-off between catering to their respective core constituencies on the one hand and "middle of the road" voters with no partisan affiliation on the other hand. In contrast to...

This paper shows how provision of public goods differ in the context of centralisation and decentralisation when the incumbent politician confers the responsibility of the actual provision to a bureaucrat who extracts bribe from the public and provides a predetermined portion of it to the...

We study identification of preferences in static single-agent discrete choice models where decision makers may be imperfectly informed about the state of the world. We leverage the notion of one-player Bayes Correlated Equilibrium by Bergemann and Morris (2016) to provide a tractable...

Why do lawyers in some jurisdictions continue to ‘automatically’ exclude the 1980 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) in their choices of law for international sales contracts? Why do lawyers in other jurisdictions approach the decision very differently? Why...

To accurately quantify the effects of government spending, it is necessary to identify exogenous changes in government spending. In this paper, we estimate a proxy VAR, developed by Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2013), using a revised supplementary budget from the government as...

This paper presents a dynamic politico-economic theory of fiscal policy to explain the simultaneous existence of public education and pensions in modern democracies. The driving force of the model is the intergenerational conflict over the allocation of the public budget. Successive generations...

Previous studies used general government data to examine whether national governments' electoral motives and ideology influenced budget composition in OECD countries. General government data includes, however, the state and local level. Using new data for general and central government over the...

While public opinion research has identified the drivers of preferences for tax progressivity,public spending and support for redistribution, the study of willingness to pay taxes remainsunderdeveloped. This paper uses the 2016 ISSP cross national survey on the Role of Governmentand the Risks...