We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that enjoy benefits upon a … potential willingness of the stakeholder to make contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency …. However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better for the stakeholder than if he …

We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that enjoy benefits upon a … potential willingness of the stakeholder to make contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency …. However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better for the stakeholder than if he …

We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that enjoy benefits upon a … potential willingness of the stakeholder to make contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency …. However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better for the stakeholder than if he …

For a two-period screening model of strikes it is shown that joint bargaining instead of enterprise negotiations lowers … wages and implies more strikes. These results hold irrespective of the party possessing private information. The sensitivity …

Strikes, just as other types of conflict, used to be difficult to explain from an economic perspective. Initially, it … asymmetric information to prominence as a significant cause of strikes. After reviewing such long-standing potential explanations … with the union can lead to strikes. Additionally, power asymmetries, reputation-building, and internal union politics can …

In this paper, we present a non-cooperative wage bargaining model in which preferences of both parties, a union and a … firm, are expressed by the sequences of discount rates varying in time. For such a wage bargaining with non … on strike in each period in which there is a disagreement. A certain generalization of the original Rubinstein bargaining …

Short-term contracts and exogenous productivity growth are introduced in asimple wage bargaining model. The equilibrium … credible, but neverwhen strike is not credible. In the limit as time between bargaining roundsvanishes only the first paradox …

To avoid strikes and curb labour militancy, some governments have introduced legislation stating that union leadership …