cost, the unique symmetric equilibrium entails disagreement with high probability. In the unique pair of pure strategy … unattainable. A strongly asymmetric authority relationship is thus the only viable alternative to costly conamp;#64258;ict …

We study a bargaining model with a disagreement game between offers and counteroffers. In order to characterize the set …

The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary … vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is immediate by the Maximum Theorem. Numerical implementation in standard …

-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …

used as commitment devices when it is impossible to commit not to renegotiate them. We characterize renegotiation …

be singular. Strategy profiles excluding perpetual disagreement guarantee non-singularity. The necessary and sufficient …

Using a sequential model of multilateral bargaining involving one buyer and two sellers, who are selling objects which … are imperfect compliments for the buyer, we analyse buyer's preferred bargaining order i.e. whether the buyer prefers to … exhibit high degree of complimentarity, multiple equilibria exist such that both the bargaining orders are preferred. For rest …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … bargaining solution is the unique stationary subgameperfect equilibrium. …