Purpose: As shareholder-elected monitors, independent non-executive directors (INEDs) should ensure that managers do not retain earnings to promote their own interests. The relationship between board independence and dividend distributions was hence investigated for selected companies listed on...

In this paper, we investigate if dividend policy is influenced by ownership type. Within the dividend literature, dividends have a signaling role regarding agency costs, such that dividends may diminish insider conflicts (reduce free cash flow) or may be used to extract cash from firms...

We empirically test the Expertise vs. Management friendly hypotheses of independent director tenure through dividend policies. We find that the likelihood and the level of dividends increase in independent director tenure, and firms with long-tenured directors are more likely to smooth...

As an alternative version of the side-payment model, this paper presents a demonstration of how the necessity of winning majority support of shareholders influences the relation between a blockholder's monitoring incentive and a firm's dividend policy. When dividend-averse individuals...

The paper analyzes whether nonfinancial firms as large blockholders of the Brazilian firm shape dividend policy. Under the Agency Theoretical framework, a set of good corporate governance practices is suggested as able to control management activity and prevent managers from incurring in moral...

We examine the association between ownership structure and dividend payout policy in a family firms dominated economy. More specifically, we test whether family firms pay higher dividend compared to counter non-family firms in Bangladesh. We argue that family firms are more likely to pay higher...

We investigate the association between dividend policy and government shareholding, using Malaysian data. We hypothesize a positive association. We contribute to the literature about dividend policy. Unique features of our study include adaptations to the Malaysian institutional setting, with...

We examine the influence of ownership concentration on payout policy in Japan. According to the monitoring hypothesis, large shareholders prefer higher dividends to mitigate the agency cost of free cash flows. In contrast, the rent extraction hypothesis assumes that large shareholders derive...

Using a sample of 85 Delaware master limited partnerships (“MLPs”) from 2004 to 2016, we examine the relation between cash dividend policy and the strength of corporate governance measured by contractual governance provisions, such as fiduciary waiver, mandatory distributions, and voting...

Using a sample of U.S. firms from 1995 to 2002, we examine corporate payout policy in dual-class firms. The expropriation hypothesis predicts that dual-class firms pay out less to shareholders because entrenched managers want to maximize the value of assets under control and the private benefits...