We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance of S&P 500 (S&P 1500) firms from 1994-2005 (1996-2005). We find that firms in which the CEO holds a considerable share of outstanding stocks outperform the market by up to 16% p.a. after controlling for traditional...

We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance. Firms in which the CEO voluntarily holds a considerable share of outstanding stocks outperform the market by more than 10% p.a. after controlling for traditional risk factors. The effect is most pronounced in firms...

We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance. Firms in which the CEO voluntarily holds a considerable share of outstanding stocks outperform the market by more than 10 percent p.a. after controlling for traditional risk factors. The effect is most pronounced in...

We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance. A strategy based on public information about managerial ownership delivers annual abnormal returns of 4 to 10%. The effect is strongest among firms with weak external governance, weak product market competition, and...

We provide an empirical assessment of two incentivizing mechanisms that help overcome agency costs caused by the separation of ownership and control: namely inside ownership and external blockholdings. Our findings suggest that defining features of these mechanisms, like high ownership and...