We study social learning and innovation in an overlapping generations model, emphasizing the trade-off between marginal innovation (combining existing technologies) and radical innovation (breaking new ground). We characterize both short-term and long-term dynamics of innovation, and the...

We study social learning and innovation in an overlapping generations model, emphasizing the trade-off between marginal innovation (combining existing technologies) and radical innovation (breaking new ground). We characterize both short-term and long-term dynamics of innovation, and the...

We analyze social learning and innovation in an overlapping generations model in which available technologies have correlated payoffs. Each generation experiments within a set of policies whose payoffs are initially unknown and drawn from the path of a Brownian motion with drift. Marginal...

How do successive, forward-looking agents experiment with interdependent and endogenous technologies? In this paper, trying a radically new technology not only is informative of the value of similar technologies, but also reduces the cost of experimenting with them, in effect expanding the space...

This paper studies network games with strategic complementarities when agents have only partial knowledge of, but some control over, how their actions are mapped into payoff-relevant outcomes. Uncertainty changes several predictions of standard network models. Equilibrium actions are positively...

Open innovation is the practice of combining internal R&D efforts with external sources of knowledge. While project developers allocate effort between internal development and external knowledge processing, knowledge brokers search for relevant external ideas. When external knowledge is...

This paper studies the interplay between a worker's signaling incentives and costly managerial oversight. The worker is privately informed about his ability. Ability affects the marginal return from effort, which is an observable choice. Contrary to the logic of oversight, the firm would benefit...

Why do innovative organizations often reallocate authority? I propose a simple theory in which innovation with new technologies generates an endogenous need for coordination among divisions in the presence of negative cross-divisional externalities. A division manager has private information...

We design a laboratory experiment in which an interested third party endowed with private information sends a public message to two conflicting players, who then make their choices. We find that third-party communication is not strategic. Nevertheless, a hawkish message by a third party makes...