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procrastination. -- Moral Hazard ; team production ; partnerships ; procrastination ; contract design ; discrimination … contracts to mitigate this form of procrastination and show that the second-best optimal contract is discriminatory. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009161322
contracts to mitigate this form of procrastination and show that the second-best optimal contract is discriminatory. We … procrastination …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013122768
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771445
breakthrough efforts and show that, in addition to free-riding, procrastination arises. Furthermore, in this model, procrastination …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304680
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an identifi...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008758145
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822065
We analyze a multitasking model with a verifiable routine task and a skill-dependent activity characterized by moral hazard. Contracts negotiated by firm/employee pairs follow from Nash bargaining. High- and low-skilled employees specialize, intermediate productivity employees perform both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013201713
For workers facing uncertain output, fixed-wage contracts provide implicit insurance compared to self-employment or performance-based pay. But like any insurance product, these contracts are prone to market distortions through moral hazard and adverse selection. Using a model of wage contracts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015414158
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This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear, capped bonus and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011773464