When risks are interdependent, loss-prevention activities of one agent influence the risks faced by others. The social return to an investment in loss-prevention is greater than the private return. From a perspective of social welfare, the market allocation is not optimal and leads to...

We study the relationship between risk managers' dark triad personality traits (Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) and their selective hedging activities. Using a primary survey of 412 professional risk managers, we find that managers with dark personality traits are more likely to...

This paper studies the effect of increased risk aversion on self-insurance and self-protection in a two-period expected utility framework in which the risk-reducing investment precedes its effect. In contrast to monoperiodic models, self-insurance and self-protection react very similarly to an...

This paper makes two contributions to the insurance literature by studying optimal insurance policy indemnity schedules with policyholders' limited liability and background risk. First, generalizing a prominent approach by Huberman, Mayers, and Smith (1983), it is shown that a welfare subsidy in...

1. Introduction -- 2. Risk and Risk Perception: Why we are not Rational in the Face of Risk -- 3. Expected Utility, Prospect Theory, and the Allais Paradox: Why Reference Points are Important -- 4. Confirmation Bias and Anchoring Effect: Why the First Piece of Information is Key in Negotiations...

This article deals with the impact of intermediaries on insurance market transparency and performance. In a market exhibiting product differentiation and coexistence of perfectly and imperfectly informed consumers, competition among insurers leads to non-existence of a pure-strategy market...