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Cabrales, Antonio; Serrano, Roberto - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 59-72

; evolutionary dynamics ; mechanisms ; stochastic stability …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506456

Mechanism design with bounded depth of reasoning and small modeling mistakes

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2014

rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401721

Level-k mechanism design

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2016 - This version: July 2016

Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515723

Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information

Cabrales, Antonio - 1997

This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementation mechanisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We … way we cast some doubt on the criticism of "complexity" commonly used against this mechanism. For mechanisms that use more … refined equilibrium concepts have claimed that the mechanisms they propose are "simple" and implement "everything" (in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014173649

Mechanism Design with Bounded Depth of Reasoning and Small Modeling Mistakes

De Clippel, Geoffroy - 2014

rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013051820

Stochastically stable implementation

Cabrales, Antonio; Serrano, Roberto - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009527058

Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game Reconsidered

Luhan, Wolfgang J.; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - 2006

While most papers on team decision-making find teams to behave more selfish, less trusting and less altruistic than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014026701

Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered

Luhan, Wolfgang J.; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - 2007 - This version: 04 May 2007

While most papers on team decision-making find that teams behave more selfishly, less trustingly and less altruistically than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009731154

Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered

Luhan, Wolfgang J.; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003486255

Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions

Kunimoto, Takashi; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2020

This paper investigates rationalizable implementation of social choice functions (SCFs) in incomplete information environments. We identify weak interim rationalizable monotonicity (weak IRM) as a novel condition and show that weak IRM is a necessary and almost sufficient condition for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014092004