In the German two-tiered system of corporate governance, it is not uncommon for chief executive officers (CEOs) to become the chairman of the supervisory board of the same company upon retirement. This practice has been discussed controversially because of potential conflicts of interest. As a...

In three self-contained essays, this dissertation deals with the impact of board structure on firm performance and with determinants of executive compensation, director compensation, and payout policy. Each of the three chapters is based on panel data sets of German firms. Distinguishing...

This paper reports the prevalence of a “one-size-fits-all” trend in the structure of executive compensation plans. The way firms distribute total compensation across different components of pay –salary, bonus, stock awards, option awards, non-equity incentives, pensions, and perquisites–...

​This paper examines the governance role of banks in replacement of underperforming CEOs in firms listed on Chinese stock exchanges. Under most circumstances, the findings suggest that the presence of outstanding loans does not increase the probability that a poorly performing CEO will be...

Conventional wisdom among corporate law theorists holds that the presence of a controlling shareholder should alleviate the problem of managerial opportunism because such a controller has both the power and incentives to curb excessive executive pay. This Article challenges that common...

We examine the impact of Australia's Remuneration Amendment Act 2011 on CEO compensation and its spill-over effect on cash holdings to better understand how the new legislation affects the principal–agent relationship. Using a sample of ASX top 300 firms from 2004 to 2015, we find that the Act...

Using five empirical methodologies to account for endogeneity issues, this study investigates the effects of board independence and managerial pay on the performance of 169 Saudi listed firms between 2007 and the end of 2014. Studying board independence and managerial pay utilises the main...

In this Article we submit that the compensation structures at banks before the financial crisis were not necessarily flawed and that recent reforms in this area largely reflect already existing best practices. In Part I we review recent empirical studies on corporate governance and executive pay...

Key points:• This article considers how the recent market turmoil affected national banking systems, thereby prompting state measures;• It describes the remuneration problems shown by the financial crisis: rewards for failure; short-term behaviour; inappropriate design of performance...