We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1], and Frohlich et al. [2], which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects' production (libertarian principle)....

This paper analyzes the relationship between the properties of the prediction errors of a predictor that assumes an autoregressive unit root and its optimal detection. According with this relationship, new autoregressive unit root tests are proposed based on multi-step prediction errors. It is...

We study how response time in a laboratory experiment on bank runs affects withdrawal decisions. In our setup, the bank has no fundamental problems, depositors decide sequentially (if to keep the money in the bank or to withdraw) and may observe previous decisions depending on the information...

We study how lines form endogenously in front of banks when depositors differ in their liquidity needs. Our model has two stages. In the first one, depositors choose the level of costly effort they want to exert to arrive early at the bank which determines the order of decisions. In the second...

We report on a large experiment testing the role of moral preferences in one-shot, anonymous ultimatum and impunity games, which vary the veto power of responders: in the impunity game, if an offer is lower than the responder's minimum acceptable offer, the proposer still receives his share,...

We report on a large, pre-registered experiment testing the role of moral preferences in oneshot, anonymous ultimatum and impunity games, which vary the veto power of responders. We measure moral preferences in two ways: through a decision problem with real economic consequences (the trade-off...