We survey the recent literature on coordination games, where there is a conflictbetween risk dominance and payoff dominance. Our main focus is on models of local interactions, where players only interact with small subsets of the overall population rather than with society as a whole. We use...

We analyze a model of price competition ά la Bertrand in a network environment. Firms only have a limited information on the structure of network: they know the number of potential customers they can attract and the degree distribution of customers. This incomplete information framework...

We experimentally explore the role of collective incentives in sustaining cooperation in finitely repeated public goods games with imperfect monitoring. In our experiment players only observe noisy signals about individual contributions, while total output is perfectly observed. We consider...

We propose a model of individual decision making that separates a central executive system (“Ego”) from a sub-self with long-term preferences (“Cold”) and an impulsive sub-self (“Hot”). Ego cares only about the payoffs of the other two subselves and allocates available resources...

Robo-advisors are novel tools in financial markets that provide investors with low-cost financial advice, usually based on individual characteristics like risk attitudes. In a portfolio choice experiment running over 10 weeks, we study how much investors benefit from robo advice. We also study...