Similar Search Results - EconBiz

The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation

Brennan, James R.; Watson, Joel - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 347-366

We study contracting and costly renegotiation in settings of complete, but unverifiable information, using the mechanism-design approach. We show how renegotiation activity is best modeled in the fundamentals of the mechanism-design framework, so that noncontractibility of renegotiation amounts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785372

Starting small and commitment

Watson, Joel - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001395214

Alternating-offer bargaining with two-sided incomplete information

Watson, Joel - In: The review of economic studies 65 (1998) 3, pp. 573-594

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001244362

Reputation in repeated games with no discounting

Watson, Joel - In: Games and economic behavior 15 (1996) 1, pp. 82-109

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001206918

Information transmission when the informed party is confused

Watson, Joel - In: Games and economic behavior 12 (1996) 1, pp. 143-161

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001195314

Strategy : an introduction to game theory

Watson, Joel - 2002 - 1. ed

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001603463

Dominance and equilibrium in alternating-offer bargaining

Watson, Joel - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000892043

Cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with perturbations

Watson, Joel - In: Games and economic behavior 7 (1994) 2, pp. 260-285

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001171280

Starting small and commitment

Watson, Joel - In: Games and economic behavior 38 (2002) 1, pp. 176-199

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001645952

Communication and superior cooperation in two-player normal form games

Watson, Joel - In: Economics letters 35 (1991) 3, pp. 267-271

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001102360

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