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Corruption in committees : an experimental study of information aggregation through voting

Morten, Rebecca B.; Tyran, Jean-Robert - In: Journal of public economic theory 17 (2015) 4, pp. 553-579

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350127

Corruption in Committees : An Experimental Study of Information Aggregation through Voting

Morton, Rebecca - 2014

We investigate experimentally the effects of corrupt experts on information aggregation in committees. We find that non-experts … are significantly less likely to delegate through abstention when there is a probability that experts are corrupt. Such … decreased abstention when the probability of corrupt experts is low, actually increases information efficiency in committee …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047178

Expert information and majority decisions

Kawamura, Kohei; Vlaseros, Vasileios - In: Journal of public economics 147 (2017), pp. 77-88

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011823447

How transparency kills information aggregation : (and why that may be a good thing) ; conference paper

Fehrler, Sebastian; Hughes, Niall - 2014

high enough. We test the model's key predictions in a laboratory experiment varying the level of transparency between … than in theory. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010486059

Public information : relevance or salience?

Invernizzi, Giovanna M. - In: Games 11 (2020) 1/4, pp. 1-28

(regardless of accuracy). A simple lab experiment contradicts both hypotheses - subjects tend to follow public information when it …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168608

Secessions and political extremism : why regional referenda do not solve the problem

Olofsgård, Anders - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 2 (2004) 5, pp. 805-832

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002233791

Robust Information Aggregation Through Voting

Midjord, Rune - 2019

Numerous theoretical studies have shown that information aggregation through voting is fragile. We consider a model of information aggregation with vote-contingent payoffs and generically characterize voting behavior in large committees. We use this characterization to identify the set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012866804

Robust Information Aggregation Through Voting

Midjord, Rune - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012868179

Information transfer and aggregation in an uninformed committee: a model for the selection and use of biased expert advice

Plott, Charles; Llewellyn, Morgan - In: European journal of political economy 40 (2015) 2, pp. 208-223

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011535685

Voting with public information

Liu, Shuo - 2017 - This version: June 2017

We study the effect of public information on collective decision-making in committees, where members can have both common and conflicting interests. In the presence of public information, the simple and efficient vote-your-signal strategy profile no longer constitutes an equilibrium under the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011729095