Acquired wisdom has it that the allocation of pollution rights to firms hinders their willingness to undertake uncertain R&D projects for environmental-friendly technologies. We revisit this issue in a model where firms strategically choose whether to participate in an auction to attain...

Profit-seeking firms can be induced to internalise the environmental damages caused by production via several policy instruments, a widely used one being emission permits. In a very influential paper, Laffont and Tirole (J Public Econ 62:127-140, 1996) point out that the allocation of pollution...

Acquired wisdom has it that the allocation of pollution rights to firms hinders their willingness to undertake uncertain R&D projects for environmental-friendly technologies. We revisit this issue in a model where firms strategically choose whether to participate in an auction to attain...

In this paper, we develop a two-country world differential game model with a polluting firm in each country where there is transportation cost to investigate the equilibrium of the game between firms when they decide to trade or not and to see under which conditions social welfare coincides with...

In this paper, we develop a two-country world differential game model with a polluting firm in each country where there is transportation cost to investigate the equilibrium of the game between firms when they decide to trade or not and to see under which conditions social welfare coincides with...