This paper evaluates the role of centralized punishment in boosting contribution to the provision of public goods. To avoid the race to the bottom in the provision of public goods, this centralized punishment mechanism relies on the use of the unilateral and tie punishment imposed on the lowest...

I examine the generalizability of a broad range of prominent learning models in explaining contribution patterns in repeated linear public goods games. Experimental data from twelve previously published papers are considered in testing several learning models in terms of how accurately they...

This paper compares the effects of two leadership styles: leading by pre-game communication and leading by example using an iterated voluntary contribution game. We find that pre-game communication increases the level of individual contributions in the game and has essentially the same impact on...

Two separate bodies of work have examined whether culture affects cooperation in economic games and whether cooperative or non-cooperative decisions occur more quickly. Here, we connect this work by exploring the relationship between decision time and cooperation in American versus Indian...

We examine communication in a 2-player sequential public good game in which the leader has private information about the return from contributing to it. The leader decides first and the follower observes the leader's contribution, before deciding whether or not to contribute. Without...

Are cooperative decisions typically made more quickly or slowly than non-cooperative decisions? While this question has attracted considerable attention in recent years, most research has focused on one-shot interactions. Yet it is repeated interactions that characterize most important...

Previous research has shown that opportunities for two-sided partner choice in finitely repeated social dilemma games can promote cooperation through a combination of sorting and opportunistic signaling, with late period defections by selfish players causing an end-game decline. How such...

Previous research has shown that opportunities for two-sided partner choice in finitely repeated social dilemma games can promote cooperation through a combination of sorting and opportunistic signaling, with late period defections by selfish players causing an end-game decline. How such...