We study, theoretically and experimentally, sealed-bid first-price auctions with and without package bidding. In the model, a global bidder bids for multiple items and can benefit from synergies, while local bidders bid for a single item. In the equilibrium, package bidding improves (hurts)...

Agent-based simulations are performed to study adaptive learning in the context of asymmetric first-price auctions. Non-linearity of the Nash equilibrium strategies is used to investigate the effect of task complexity on adaptive learning by varying the degree of approximation the agents can...

This online appendix contains the plots and supplemental descriptions for "Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions Credible? Semi- & Nonparametric Analyses."The paper "Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions Credible? Semi- & Nonparametric Analyses" to which this Supplement...

Structural asymmetric first-price auction estimation methods have provided numerous empirical studies. However, due to the unobserved nature of underlying valuations, the accuracy of estimates is not feasibly testable with field data, a fact that could inhibit empirical auction market designs...

This paper experimentally tests a moral hazard model with inequity aversion. In the model, the probability of high and low employer's revenues is determined by actions of the worker. The employer offers a revenue-dependent wage to an inequity-averse worker. In contrast to the models that assume...

This article explores the practice of bundling a free unit of good y (drink) with a threshold purchase of good x (food). Allowing for heterogeneity in consumer drink preferences we characterize the conditions under which the practice is strictly more profitable than linear pricing. An increase...

This article explores the effect of a subset of symmetric bidders joining to bid together. Possible applications include mergers, collusion and legal joint-bidding arrangements. The change produces a "strong" party with a more advantageous value distribution than the remaining "weak" bidder(s)....