We study how financial intermediation affects real market variables when an incumbent firm is threatened by entry to its market and must contract with a bank for outside funds. Contracts between the bank and the monopolist are short-term and redesigned after the entry decision of a second firm...

We study the relationship between financial contracting and entry deterrence when the potential entrant observes the market price but does not observe the financial contract. This leads to the possibility that the entrant and the lender have different beliefs about the incumbent's costs, due to...

The standard Ricardian model of competition has a fixed number of firms, each with limited capacity and differential exogenous costs or qualities. In this paper, we introduce a real entry process by formulating a multistage Ricardian equilibrium model with free entry and stochastic product...

We examine the effect of a threat of entry on experimentation about demand by an incumbent monopolist when there is a fixed cost of entry. We also examine the impact of experimentation on the probability of entry into the market. We show that experimentation may itself be used as a tool for...

We consider separately strategic entry and asymmetric information in the design of the settlement policy governing patent disputes, with a focus on Shapiro(2003)'s consumer protection rule. We show that, when a potential entrant strategically incurs an entry cost before engaging in a patent...

Nuclear meltdown in Japan and civil society strife across the Middle East highlight the degree to which resilience is core to international peace and security. This article considers the means by which communities can become increasingly resilient through shared best practices across a range of...