In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations, where one player - the truster - decides whether to trust, and the other player - the temptee - has a temptation to betray when trusted. The...

In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations where the players meet but once. One player - the truster - decides whether to trust, and the other player - the temptee - has a temptation to...

"In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations, where the trusted player, called the temptee, has a temptation to betray. The strength of the temptation to betray varies from encounter to...

In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations where the players meet but once. One player - the truster - decides whether to trust, and the other player - the temptee - has a temptation to...

We study the problem of allocating multiple items to two agents whose cardinal preferences are private information. If money is available, Bayesian incentive compatibility and ex-ante Pareto efficiency can be achieved using the Expected Externality Mechanism (EEM). Absent money, under certain...

We present a study of the group purchasing behavior of daily deals in Groupon and LivingSocial and introduce a predictive dynamic model of collective attention for group buying behavior. In our model, the aggregate number of purchases at a given time comprises two types of processes: random...