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A model of Chinese central government : the role of reciprocal accountability

Gilli, Mario; Li, Yuan - In: The economics of transition 21 (2013) 3, pp. 451-477

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010234760

Inequality, infrastructure, and institutions : empirical studies in public economics and political economy

Dorn, Florian - 2021

Florian Dorn erstellte diesen Beitrag während seines Promotionsstudiums an der Universität München (LMU). Die Studie wurde im September 2020 abgeschlossen und von der Fakultät für Volkswirtschaftslehre als Dissertation angenommen. Die Dissertation trägt zur Empirie der Ökonomie des...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012807266

Global Insecurity, Transparency and Sustainable Development : African Challenges

Nwaobi, Godwin Chukwudum - 2013

Notably, the 20th century was dominated by the legacy of devastating global wars, colonial struggles, and ideological conflicts as well as effort s to establish international systems that would foster global peace and prosperity. Yet, insecurity and corruption not only remain, they have become...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014155224

Transitions and Political Stability in Autocracies. The Role of Public Perception

Gilli, Mario; Li, Yuan - 2018

intermediate level an increment in opacity might actually increase the likelihood of a selectorate coup. Finally, also the expected …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014112583

Gordon Tullock's theory of dictatorship and revolution

Apolte, Thomas - 2015

We assess Gordon Tullock's work on dictatorship and revolutions using a common analytic framework that captures the dynamics of mutually reinforcing perceptions within a potentially rebelling subgroup of a population. We can reconstruct all of Tullock's central findings but we also find him...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487522

Abused rebels and winning coalitions : regime change under the pressure of rebellions

Apolte, Thomas - 2015

solving the collective action problem that may otherwise restrain them in revolting against an incumbent. Recent selectorate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487527

Autocracy and the public : mass revolts, winning coalitions, and policy control in dictatorships

Apolte, Thomas - 2015

Threats of mass revolts could effectively constrain a dictator's public policy if it were not for the collective-action problem. Mass revolts nevertheless happen, but they follow a stochastic pattern. We describe this pattern in a threshold model of collective action and integrate it into an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011336491

A Model of Chinese Central Government : The Role of Reciprocal Accountability

Gilli, Mario - 2013

support of the selectorate to hold on to power. Our main result is that in autocracies without electoral discipline, to … restrain the opportunistic behavior of a leader, the size of the selectorate should be intermediate: if too small, the … selectorate is captured by the leader and has no disciplinary role; if too big, the leaders incentives are diluted …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013079349

Term limits and electoral accountability

Smart, Michael; Sturm, Daniel - In: Journal of public economics 107 (2013), pp. 93-102

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010257953

Independent auditors, bias, and political agency

Warren, Patrick L. - In: Journal of public economics 96 (2012) 1/2, pp. 78-88

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009549284