We discover that letting agents pairwise sequentially exchange at "wrong" prices has a robust effect on prices at convergence. If the initial relative price for a good is cheaper than the equilibrium walrasian price due to initial endowments, the initial excess demand effect pushes resource...

This paper characterizes the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of a symmetric, pure exchange economy with two goods and N agents with uniformly distributed preferences and identical endowments. Relaxing the auctioneer assumption, but maintaining a global price rule, sequentially random pairwise...

Double auctions with profit-motivated human traders as well as quot;zero-intelligencequot; programmed traders have previously been shown to converge to Pareto optimal allocations in partial equilibrium settings. We show that these results remain robust in two-good general equilibrium settings...

We consider a pure exchange economy repeated for an indefinite number of periods from a fixed endowment and posit a learning rule which directs convergence to competitive equilibrium. In each period trade converges to an allocation in the contract set, where agents interpret the current (common)...

The epsilon-intelligent competitive equilibrium algorithm is a decentralized alternative to Walrus' tatonnement procedure for markets to arrive at competitive equilibrium. We build on the Gode-Spear-Sunder zero-intelligent algorithm in which random generation of bids and offers from agents'...

This paper describes MOLES 1.0, an integrated land-use and transport model developed with Object-Oriented Programming principles in order to combine selected characteristics from Spatial Computable General Equilibrium and microsimulation models.

A new methodology for calibrating parameters when working with intractable, dynamic structural models is developed. A straight-forward extension also allows for formal estimation and hypothesis testing in a Generalized Method of Moment framework. The method is based on multigrid techniques used...

Most of the major policy reforms being considered result in winners and losers. It would be nice if this were not so, and one could devise reforms that were "win-win" propositions when one digs beneath the public rhetoric. Unfortunately, life does not often present reforms that meet the Pareto...

In this paper we propose an equilibrium model that allows to analyze subsidization schemes to affect locational choices for generation investment in electricity markets. Our framework takes into account generation investment decided by private investors and redispatch as well as network...