This paper examines the relationship between the concentration of political power in legislative bargaining and the predictability of the process governing the recognition of legislators. Our main result establishes that, for a broad class of legislative bargaining games, if the recognition...

This paper examines the relationship between the concentration of political power in legislative bargaining and the predictability of the process governing the recognition of legislators. Our main result establishes that, for a broad class of legislative bargaining games, if the recognition...

The strategy of parties regarding which issues to emphasize during electoral campaigns is an important aspect of electoral competition. In this paper, we advance research on electoral competition by developing a multidimensional model of electoral competition in which parties compete for...

Essential to the Madisonian conception of checks and balances is the division of policy-making authority among multiple actors such that each can veto proposed changes in policy. We use a mechanism design approach to analyze checks and balances institutions. We show that checks and balances...