Showing 1 - 10 of 28,961
This paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158784
We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011386160
We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences and a uniform type distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702289
It is often argued that certifiers have an incentive to offer inflated certificates, although they deny it. In this paper, we study a model in which a certifier is paid by sellers, and may offer them inflated certificates, but incurs costs if doing so. We find that the certifier may face a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009411261
We examine multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, an informed expert can send messages to an uninformed decision maker more than once, and the uninformed decision maker can pay money to the informed expert...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671657
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014321141
way that can be predicted by the credibility of the neologism; and receivers' behavior indicates that they understand …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011994751
In this paper we attempt to compare theoretically and experimentally three models of strategic information transmission. In particular we focus on the models by Crawford & Sobel (1982), Lai (2010) and Ehses-Friedrich (2011). These three models differ in the information that the receiver...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085
We study communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private information about their costs. We show that cheap talk between the firms cannot transmit any information. However, if the firms can communicate through a third party,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009633349
We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one sender case, we show that correlation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189326