I show that a unique equilibrium exists in a two-player all-pay auction with asymmetric independent discrete signal distributions and asymmetric interdependent valuations. The proof is constructive, and the construction is simple to implement as a computer program. For special cases, which...

This note shows that participation by many players in deterministic contests arises when different players have different cost advantages in different regions of the competition, and not from incomplete information per se

This paper studies equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models asymmetric multiprize competitions in which players’ costs are non-decreasing. Such costs accommodate head starts, which capture incumbency advantages, prior investments, and technological differences. I provide an...

Consumer surplus in a market is affected by how the market is segmented. We study the maximum consumer surplus across all possible segmentations of a given market served by a multi product monopolist. We characterize markets for which the maximum consumer surplus equals a first best benchmark...

I consider competitions in which, conditional on winning or losing, the effort exerted by a competitor does not necessarily decrease his payoff. This happens, for example, in competitions for promotions in which workers are intrinsically motivated, and in research and development races in...