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On the overthrow or endurance of kings

Tridimas, George - In: Constitutional political economy 27 (2016) 1, pp. 41-65

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011742208

Constitutional monarchy as power sharing

Tridimas, George - In: Constitutional political economy 32 (2021) 4, pp. 431-461

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012651351

The Strategic of Conflict in Colombia

Estrada, Fernando - 2010

This article proposes a reading of the armed conflict from an evolutionary design that takes into account the concept … of private protection agencies in the works of Schelling/ Nozic/Gambetta. Their aim is to assess the dynamics of conflict …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199910

China in Context : Energy, Water, and Climate Cooperation

Burleson, Elizabeth - 2014

Climate resilient communities can be achieved with the support of global research, development, deployment, and diffusion of environmentally sound low GHG emission technologies and processes. Technology cooperation should lower emissions remaining mindful of biodiversity, ecosystem services and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045386

Emerging Law Addressing Climate Change and Water

Burleson, Elizabeth - 2015

The World Economic Forum recognizes that while restrictions on energy affect water systems and vise versa, energy and water policy are rarely coordinated. The International Panel on Climate Change predicts that wet places will become wetter and dry places will become dryer. Transboundary water,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196020

From High to Low Stakes Politics : Should Majoritarians Embrace Countermajoritarian Constitutional Provisions?

Weingast, Barry R. - 2018

Robert Dahl asked, How Democratic is the United States Constitution? (2001). To address this question, Dahl embraces majoritarian democracy as his normative standard. Because the framers designed the U.S. Constitution with a wide array of constraints on majorities, Dahl’s answer is, not very....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014113973

The Origins of Democracy : A Model with Application to Ancient Greece

Fleck, Robert K.; Hanssen, F. Andrew - 2002

This paper seeks to provide an improved understanding of the origins of democracy. It begins by developing a theoretical model to demonstrate how exogenous economic conditions can influence both the incentives to establish democratic institutions and the likelihood that such institutions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014112734

How and Why Economies Develop and Grow : Lessons from Preindustrial Europe and China

Kohn, Meir - 2010

Why are we rich and others poor? What is preventing the less-developed countries from catching up with the more developed? How did we become rich? Underlying these questions are more fundamental ones: What is the nature of economic progress? What are its causes? I seek the answers to these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135194

Why Some Democracies are Headed by a Monarch?

Tridimas, George - 2014

liberal opposition to share office rents, while the alternative to the negotiation is a violent conflict that ends with either … deposition of the monarchy or absolute rule by the monarch. A model of conflict between the king and the liberal opposition is … explored where conflict for office rents is a costly contest with probabilistic outcomes and results in a reduction of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013050916

Long Live the Doge? Death as a Term Limit on Venetian Chief Executives

Smith, Daniel J. - 2020

Can an electorate use the projected life expectancy of a lifetime-appointed executive to enforce binding, informal term limits? Informal term limits, based on the life expectancy of an executive candidate at election, would enable an electorate to exercise discretion in adjusting tenure lengths...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852803