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The government wants two tasks to be performed. In each task, unobservable effort can be exerted by a wealth-constrained private contractor. If the government faces no binding budget constraints, it is optimal to bundle the tasks. The contractor in charge of both tasks then gets a bonus payment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891764
We examine how the U.S. Federal Government governs R&D contracts with private-sector firms. The government chooses between two contractual forms: grants and cooperative agreements. The latter provides the government substantially greater discretion over, and monitoring of, project progress....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917011
A government agency wants a facility to be built and managed to provide a public service. Two different modes of provision are considered. In a public-private partnership, the tasks of building and managing are bundled, whereas under traditional procurement, these tasks are delegated to separate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116354
We revisit the contract-theoretic literature on privatization initiated by Hart et al. (1997). This literature has two major shortcomings. First, it is focused on ex-ante investment incentives, whereas ex-post inefficiencies which are ubiquitous in the real world cannot be explained. Second,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014348766
We compare two procurement mechanisms, bundling and unbundling, in a two-stage auction model with risk-averse suppliers … that an increase in the aggregate risk renders bundling less preferable to unbundling, from the viewpoint of both the buyer … and the society. The result still holds even if subcontracting is possible under bundling. On the other hand, an increase …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013099394
investments to come up with innovations. It turns out that depending on the nature of the innovations, bundling may either …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013249035
Deadlines and penalties are widely used to incentivize effort. We model how these incentive contracts affect the work rate and time taken in a procurement setting, characterizing the efficient contract design. Using new micro-level data on Minnesota highway construction contracts that includes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013091947
This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012160310
This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415488
Once the nation commits to engage in heavy, sustained military action abroad, particularly including the deployment of ground forces, political support is scrupulously observed and dissected. One of the most graphic factors influencing that support is the number of military soldiers who have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043515